An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. (...) But this argument works only if the following claims are true: all humans have access to roadkill, roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don’t themselves consume it, it’s impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each claim is deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats. (shrink)

Investigates the resolution of contradictions and ambiguous derogations in a code, by means of the imposition of partial orderings. Although formulated as a study in the logic of norms, it provided the initial ideas for work on the logic of theory (or belief) change, developed by the authors in a series of papers by the authors and Peter Gardenfors beginning in 1985.

Because spaying/neutering animals involves the harming of some animals in order to prevent harm to others, some ethicists, like David Boonin, argue that the philosophy of animal rights is committed to the view that spaying/neutering animals violates the respect principle and that Trap Neuter Release programs are thus impermissible. In response, I demonstrate that the philosophy of animal rights holds that, under certain conditions, it is justified, and sometimes even obligatory, to cause harm to some animals in order to prevent (...) greater harm to others. As I will argue, causing lesser harm to some animals in order to prevent greater harm to others, as TNR programs do, is compatible with the recognition of the inherent value of the ones who are harmed. Indeed, we can, and do, spay/neuter cats while acknowledging that they have value in their own right. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...) or wrongness of affecting another’s mental states. This “moral thought” about the rightness or wrongness is not yet demonstrated in even the most intelligent nonhuman animals, thus we should suspend our judgments about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their actions while further questioning the recent insistence on developing an animal morality. (shrink)

It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who (...) dies. (shrink)

Paul Crowther, in his book, The Kantian Sublime (1989), works to reconstruct Kant's aesthetics in order to make its continued relevance to contemporary aesthetic concerns more visible. The present article remains within the area of Crowther's "cognitive" sublime, to show that there is much space for expanding upon Kantian varieties of the sublime, particularly in art.

Merleau-Ponty hat in keiner seiner Schriften eine systematische Hermeneutik ausgearbeitet, doch finden sich in fast allen seinen Arbeiten Bemerkungen über hermeneutisch relevante Sachverhalte. Dies gilt vornehmlich für Passagen über die Erfahrung anderer Subjektivität, über die dialogische Erfahrung und über das Produzieren und Verstehen sprachlicher Äusserungen. In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, Merleau-Ponty's Auffassungen hinsichtlich der Fragen nach Sinn, Genesis und Struktur des Verstehens vorzustellen. Hierbei wird in erste Linie das Problem berücksichtigt, was sich eigentlich vollzieht, wenn man als Leser die Bekanntschaft (...) eines klassischen, bzw. ursprünglichen Werkes macht. Das Werk spricht eine neue Sprache (parole parlante, langage conquérante), die die vorgegebene Sprache (parole parlée, langage institué) neugestaltet, so wie auch die in der neuen Sprache sich niederschlagende Erfahnings- und Gedankenwelt unsere alten Gedanken auflöst und uns eine neue Sicht auf die Wirklichkeit vermittelt. Hermeneutisch relevant ist, dass der Sinn dieser parole pensante, bzw. der pensée parlante niemals vollständig gegeben ist, noch auch durch welche Auslegung dann auch je erschöpft werden kann. Das bei der Lektüre eines solchen ursprünglichen Werkes sich bildende primäre Verständnis ist als Grundlage einer sekundären Verstehensleistung anzusehen, die das Thema der Hermeneutik, insofern sie Auslegungskunst ist, darstellt. Die Rekonstruktion des ursprünglichen Sinnes eines solchen Werkes ist in den Augen Merleau-Ponty's nicht nur in ihrer Möglichkeit beschränkt, sie ist vielmehr auch nur von untergeordneter Bedeutung. Was das erste betrifft, so sieht sich jeder solcher Rekonstruktionsversuch, (der bei der Restitution des ursprünglichen Textsinnes auch die Biographie des Autors und den historischen Kontext zu berücksichtigen hat – das Werk muss ja als Antwort auf Fragen verstanden werden, die sich im Lebenszusammenhang einer Zeit gestellt haben –) mit der Tatsache konfrontiert, dass die Gedanken und Erfahrungen, die sich in einem Werk niedergeschlagen haben, häufig so sehr miteinander verwoben sind, zum andern sich im Laufe des Lebens ihres Urhebers sich verändern, dass ihre völlige Inventarisierung zu einer unmöglichen Aufgabe wird. Zudem gehört zum Sinn eines solchen Werkes auch die Wirkung, die es in der Nachwelt hervorgerufen hat. So ist der „Wahre Descartes” keine gleichsam sich selbst erhellende Ganzheit, kein absoluter Entwurf im Sinne Sartres – sondern das Ganze von Leben, Werk und Interpretationen, das niemals definitiv entziffert werden kann. Für Merleau-Ponty ist der Sinn in fortwährendem Werden begriffen. Hierin ist jedoch auch die Bedeutung der wahren Interpretation, bzw. des wahren Denkens gelegen. Wichtiger als die in sich begrenzte Möglichkeit der Rekonstruktion ist dann auch das „penser derechef”. Merleau-Ponty beruft sich ausdrücklich auf einen Gedanken von Heidegger, demzufolge der Sinn des Denkens vor allem darin gelegen ist, das noch Ungesagte und Ungedachte in einem klassischen Werk zu entfalten. In der Tat prägt dies auch die Weise, in der Merleau-Ponty mit dem Werk Husserls oder anderer Denker umgeht. Es ist Merleau-Ponty leider nicht mehr gegeben gewesen, die rudimentären Bemerkungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, die sich in seinem letzten Werk finden, weiter auszuarbeiten, noch auch alle Konsequenzen seiner Hermeneutik zu durchdenken, in der das Fundament der Wahrheit sowohl in der Zeit lokalisiert bleibt als auch zugleich einer die Zeit überspannenden Teleologie eingefügt ist. (shrink)

The philosophy of animal rights is often characterized as an exclusively justice oriented approach to animal liberation that is unconcerned with, and moreover suspicious of, moral emotions, like sympathy, empathy, and compassion. I argue that the philosophy of animal rights can, and should, acknowledge that compassion plays an integral role in animal liberation discourse and theory. Because compassion motivates moral actors to relieve the serious injustices that other animals face, or, at the very least, compassion moves actors not to participate (...) in or cause these injustices, the philosophy of animal rights can and should recognize both a duty to cultivate compassion and a duty to promote compassion. Contra to feminist critiques of Regan’s justice-approach to ethics, the philosophy of animal rights is not committed to eschewing the moral emotions. (shrink)